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We measure heterogeneity in risk aversion among households in Thai villages using a full risk-sharing
model and complement  the results with a measure based on optimal portfolio choice. Among households
with relatives living in the same village, full insurance cannot be rejected, suggesting that relatives
provide something close to a complete-markets consumption allocation. There is substantial heterogeneity
in risk preferences estimated from the full-insurance model,  positively correlated in most villages
with portfolio-choice estimates. The heterogeneity matters for policy: Although the average household
would benefit from eliminating village-level risk, less-risk-averse households who are paid to absorb
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We measure heterogeneity in risk aversion among households running farm and non-
farm enterprises in a developing country using a full risk-sharing model and complement the
results with a measure based on optimal portfolio choice. From the literature on risk sharing, a
household's risk aversion is identied up to scale by examining how much its consumption co-
moves with aggregate consumption. The intuition | which dates to Wilson (1968) | is that
ecient risk sharing allocates more risk to less risk-averse households, so a household whose
consumption strongly co-moves with the aggregate must be relatively less risk averse. The
second, auxiliary method comes from portfolio choice theory and uses measures of volatility in
the household's consumption growth and in the return on the household's capital assets. The
intuition behind this second method | famously exploited with aggregate data to identify the
preferences of the representative agent by Mehra and Prescott (1985) | is that the more risk
averse a household is, the safer a portfolio it will choose and the smoother its consumption
will be.
The data we analyze are an unusually long monthly panel of households in villages in
Thailand, which includes information on the existence of kinship groups living in the same
village. For households who have kin living in the village, we nd evidence of nearly complete
risk sharing. Indeed, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of full risk sharing, even though we
use a powerful test that is biased toward rejection if preferences are heterogeneous. We do
reject full insurance among households that have no kin in the village, suggesting strongly that
gifts and insurance transfers among family-related households are providing something close
to a complete markets allocation. Evidently, informal village institutions in Thailand provide
risk sharing similar to what is implicitly assumed when researchers estimate representative-agent models using data from the New York nancial markets. Our ndings on networks
echo the result of Samphantharak and Townsend (2010a, chapter 6) that membership in a
kinship network reduces the eect of liquidity constraints on households' nancing of xed
assets and the result of Kinnan and Townsend (2010) that kinship networks are important
for households' access to nancing and ability to smooth consumption. Since the theory
appears to t best the households with relatives in the village, we restrict the sample to
these households for the remainder of the analysis. This restriction is similar to, for example,
Vissing-Jrgensen's (2002) method of estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
on a restricted sample of households that participate in the stock and bond markets.
Using the sample of households with kin in the village, we then show that there is
substantial heterogeneity in risk preferences as estimated from the full-insurance model, and
that such estimates are positively correlated in most villages with the estimates from portfolio
choice. That our distinct measures of risk tolerance are positively correlated with each other
in most villages gives us some condence in their validity. However, the correlations are
weak, suggesting that each set of estimates may contain substantial amounts of measurement
error. We nd that neither of the two measures of risk tolerance is signicantly correlated with
demographic variables or household wealth. The nding of no correlation between preferences
and wealth is consistent, however, with the complete markets hypothesis and, since we are
measuring relative risk tolerance, consistent with the nding of Chiappori and Paiella (2008)
that the correlation between wealth and relative risk aversion | as estimated from portfolio
structures in Italian panel data | is very weak. In addition, the lack of correlation between
preferences and demographics is reminiscent of the \massive unexplained heterogeneity" in
Italian households' preferences reported by Guiso and Paiella (2008).
2Heterogeneity in risk tolerance matters for policy. To make this point, we conduct
a hypothetical experiment in which we estimate the welfare gains and losses that would
result from eliminating all aggregate, village-level risk. If all households were equally risk
averse, all households would benet from eliminating aggregate risk. Heterogeneity makes
the situation more interesting. As demonstrated by Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) using U.S. data,
heterogeneity in preferences implies that some suciently risk-tolerant households would
experience welfare losses from eliminating aggregate risk, because these households eectively
sell insurance against aggregate risk to their more risk-averse neighbors and collect risk premia
for doing so. In the Thai data, we nd that households live with a great deal of aggregate
risk | gure 1 shows the volatility of aggregate consumption in each village, with a monthly
standard deviation of about 0.14 percent | and that the average household would be willing
to pay to avoid this risk. However, not all households would be willing to pay. In fact, if
aggregate risk were eliminated, some relatively risk-tolerant households would suer welfare
losses equivalent to several percent of mean consumption. Heterogeneity in the population
is, therefore, substantial.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we lay out the theory underlying our
two methods for estimating preferences. In section 3, we describe the Thai data. Section 4
presents the empirical results, and section 5 concludes. The appendix contains some mathe-
matical derivations.
2. Theory
In this section, we derive two methods to estimate households' risk preferences: one
based on measurements of risk sharing among households, and the other based on households'
3choices of asset portfolios. For both methods, we assume that there is one consumption
good, c. We assume that households maximize time-separable discounted expected utility
with constant relative risk aversion. We allow each household to have its own rate of time
preference and its own coecient of relative risk aversion. Because we will work with monthly
data, we need to distinguish consumption uctuations that are due to risk from consumption
uctuations that are due to seasonal preferences. Therefore, we also allow each household
to have month-specic preferences. That is, household i's preferences over consumption
sequences fc













where i is the household's rate of time preference, i is the household's coecient of
relative risk aversion, i;m is the household's relative preference for consuming in month
m 2 fJan, Feb,:::;Decg, and m(t) is the month corresponding to date t. We assume i;m is
non-stochastic.
For the risk-sharing method, we also assume that consumption is measured with error:
We assume that we observe not true consumption c
it but instead cit = c
it exp(it). Our
assumptions on the measurement error it are relatively weak. We assume that it is mean
independent of the date t and of village aggregate consumption Cjt(st) (dened more precisely
below), has mean zero for each household, and is uncorrelated across households:
E[itji;t;Cjt(s
t)] = 0




4Notice in particular that we are not assuming anything about homoskedasticity or serial
correlation of the measurement errors.
After deriving the two methods, we show that we can also use the data to estimate
the welfare cost of aggregate risk in the villages in our data, as a function of households' risk
preferences.
A. Risk-Sharing Method
Let Cjt(st) be the aggregate consumption available in village j at date t after history
st. (We take no stand on storage or inter-village risk sharing. If storage is possible, Cjt(st) is
aggregate consumption net of any aggregate storage. If risk is shared between villages, Cjt(st)
is aggregate consumption in village j after any transfers to or from other villages.) Then,



















where j(i) is household i's village, i is a non-negative Pareto weight, and jt(st) is the
Lagrange multiplier on village j's aggregate resource constraint
P
i c
it(st) = Cjt(st) at date t
after history st. The multiplier jt(st) is a function only of aggregate resources Cjt(st); for a
given village j, any two histories with the same aggregate resources at a particular date will
have the same  at that date.
The rst term in (3) is a household-specic xed eect; some households simply are
better o than others and, on average, consume more. The second term is a household-specic
trend. Formally, these trends depend on the household's rate of time preference i; informally,
the household-specic trends could stand for anything that makes some households want to
5have dierent trends in consumption than other households, such as life-cycle considerations.
The third term reects dierences in the seasonality of households' preferences. The fourth
term shows how consumption depends on aggregate shocks jt: Consumption moves more
with aggregate shocks for less risk-averse households.
Equation (3) reects Wilson's (1968) result that doubling every household's coef-
cient of relative risk aversion will not change the set of Pareto-ecient allocations: The
consumption allocation in (3) does not change if, for any non-zero constant mj specic to vil-
lage j, we replaced i with mji, replaced j(i);t with mjj(i);t, and adjusted i, i, and i;m(t)
appropriately. In consequence, when we use a method based on (3) to estimate preferences,
we will be able to identify risk preferences only up to scale within each village.
Since consumption is measured with error, an equation for observed consumption













( lnj(i);t) + it; (4)
where we have suppressed the dependence on the history st for convenience.
We do two things. First, we test for ecient risk sharing. Then, under the maintained
hypothesis of ecient risk sharing, we use (4) to estimate households' risk preferences.
Test of Ecient Risk Sharing
The standard test for ecient risk sharing in the literature (e.g., Cochrane, 1991;
Mace, 1991; Townsend, 1994) can be described as follows. If agents share risk eciently, then
the individual consumption of agent i should depend only on aggregate shocks, as described














( lnj(i);t) + bj lnincomeit + it; (5)
where household i lives in village j(i). The test, now, would be whether the coecient bj
is signicantly dierent from zero. Ecient risk sharing would imply bj = 0, whereas any
deviation from perfect risk sharing would result in bj > 0.
In practice, however, we use a slightly dierent test; that is, we run the regression
lncit = ai + dj(i);t + bj lnincomeit + uit; (6)
where djt represents the aggregate shock in village j at date t. (Note that, for the sake of
precision, we write djt rather than jt in this equation; indeed, if bj 6= 0, our structural model
in the previous section is incorrect and djt is some kind of aggregate shock but need not be
the Lagrange multiplier jt.)
The key dierence between (5) and (6) is that (6) ignores heterogeneity in preferences
and absorbs the household-specic trends and seasonality into the aggregate shocks djt. The
motivation for this variant is that allowing heterogeneity in risk preferences, time preferences,
or seasonal preferences would make the test less powerful. Indeed, several authors have showed
that rejecting full insurance is harder in the presence of heterogeneity; therefore, by ignoring
heterogeneity, we bias our test toward rejecting full insurance.1 Since our goal is to show
1The intuition is that whenever more risk-tolerant households' incomes are (weakly) more correlated with
the aggregate shock | as seems natural | then the common-preferences test is (weakly) biased against the
7that the evidence against full insurance is weak, we want to strengthen our case by using as
powerful a test as we can | hence the choice not to allow heterogeneity. Below, we will show
that our test is suciently powerful to reject full insurance in some relatively small samples
of households that are not in kinship networks. However, in larger samples of households in
kinship networks, we do not reject full insurance, even though the test is more powerful in
larger samples.
Estimating Preferences
If there is full insurance, then the data must satisfy (4), and we can use this equation to
estimate each household's risk preferences i. (In principle, we can also estimate each house-
hold's time preferences i, but that is not our goal here | primarily because i is dicult
to interpret since it represents a combination of pure time preference and life-cycle motives.)
The intuition for how we estimate risk preferences is that under full insurance, a household
whose consumption moves more with aggregate shocks must be less risk averse. Further, un-
der full insurance, the only reason two households' consumptions can move together is that
both of their consumptions are co-moving with aggregate shocks. Thus, if two households'
consumptions are strongly correlated, they both must have consumption that moves strongly
with the aggregate shock; they must both be relatively risk tolerant. Similarly, if two house-
holds' consumptions are not strongly correlated, at least one must have consumption that
does not move strongly with the aggregate shock; at least one must be very risk averse. In
null of full insurance while the heterogeneous-preferences test is not biased. This, plus the fact that the
common-preferences test estimates fewer parameters and hence has more residual degrees of freedom and
more power against alternatives, implies that the common-preferences test will reject the null (weakly) more
often than the heterogeneous-preferences test if the null is true, and strictly more often if the null is false.
The reader is referred to Mazzocco and Saini (2009) and Schulhofer-Wohl (2010) for a precise discussion of
these issues.
8consequence, we can identify relatively more and less risk-averse households by looking at the
pairwise correlations of their consumption.
Our method uses only the data on households whose consumption is observed in every
time period. Suppose that there are J villages and that for each village j, we have data on
Nj households observed in T time periods. These need not be all households in the village
for all time periods in which the village has existed.
Let fitgT
t=1 be the residuals from linearly projecting the time series of log consumption
for household i on a household-specic intercept, time trend, and month dummies. Log
consumption is the left-hand side of (4). Thus, since (4) holds and projection is a linear
operator, the log consumption residuals it must equal the total of the residuals we would
obtain from separately projecting each term on the right-hand side of (4) on a household-
specic intercept, time trend, and month dummies. There are no residuals from projecting
the rst three terms on the right-hand side since these terms are equal to a household-
specic intercept, time trend, and month dummies. Thus it must equal the total of the
residuals from projecting ( lnjt) and it. Specically, suppose that we could observe the
Lagrange multipliers jt, and let `jt be the residual we would obtain if we hypothetically
projected ( lnjt) on an intercept, a time trend, and month dummies.2 Also suppose that
we could observe the measurement errors it, and let ~ it be the residual we would obtain if we
hypothetically projected the time series of it on a household-specic intercept, time trend,
2The results of this projection will be the same for all households in a village since the panel is balanced
and jt is the same for all households in the village.




`j(i);t + ~ it: (7)
Since it is uncorrelated across households, (7) implies that for any two households i and i0






jt]; i 6= i
0: (8)
As discussed above, risk aversion is identied only up to scale within each village; equation
(7) would not change if, for any non-zero constant mj specic to village j, we replaced i
with mji and `j with mj`j. Since the scale mj is unidentied, we can normalize E[`2
jt] = 1.




; i 6= i
0: (9)
Equation (9) applies to each pair of distinct households, so the equation gives us Nj(Nj 1)=2
moment conditions in Nj unknowns (the risk aversion coecients fig
Nj
i=1). In principle, we
could use these moment conditions to estimate the risk aversion coecients by the Generalized
Method of Moments. However, we would then have many more moment conditions than
months of data | for example, in a village with Nj = 30 households, which is typical, we
would have 435 moment conditions but only 84 months of data | and GMM can perform
poorly when there are many moment conditions (Han and Phillips, 2006). We therefore
collapse (9) to one moment condition per household by summing over the other households











Equation (10) gives us Nj moment conditions in Nj unknowns, so we have a just-
identied system. We use these just-identied moment conditions to estimate the parameters
by GMM.3 We can also use GMM to test the null hypothesis that all households in village
j have identical preferences, by imposing the restriction that 1 = 2 =  = Nj and then
testing the Nj   1 overidentifying restrictions with the usual Hansen (1982) 2 statistic.
In our GMM estimation, we must impose a sign normalization on the estimated co-
ecients of relative risk aversion since the moment conditions do not change if we multiply
each i by  1. Since the true coecients of relative risk aversion must be positive, we impose
the normalization that
PNj
i=1 i > 0.
B. Portfolio-Choice Method
We can also use a simple portfolio choice and asset pricing model (Breeden, 1979;
Lucas, 1978; Rubinstein, 1976) to recover households' preferences from their asset holdings.4
3An alternative approach would be to observe that (4) is essentially a factor model | the Lagrange
multiplier lnjt is an unobserved factor, and risk tolerance 1=i is the factor loading that species how
the factor impacts household i | and to estimate the equation by standard factor analysis methods. With
a small number of households, as here, the identifying assumption for factor analysis would be that the
measurement errors it are uncorrelated over time and across households and that their variance is constant
across households at each date t. Examination of the residuals from the equation suggests, however, that the
variance diers across households. Thus we were not condent in the factor analysis assumptions and did not
pursue that approach.
4The rst application of this idea was by Mehra and Prescott (1985), who used asset pricing equations to
compute the risk aversion of a representative agent from aggregate consumption data. Mehra and Prescott
(1985) concluded that, because the average return on equities in U.S. data is quite high compared with
the variances of consumption growth and the return on equities, the representative agent would have to be
extremely risk averse to rationalize the data. Below, we nd more reasonable values for risk aversion because
the variances of returns and consumption growth are higher in our data.
11Suppose that household i optimally allocates its assets across a portfolio of assets k
that have stochastic gross returns Rk
t+1. The household's Euler equation requires that, for















Taking the unconditional expectation of both sides, applying the law of iterated expectations











































In particular, (12) must hold for any risk-free asset that the household chooses to hold. The
households in our sample typically hold inventories of their products; as long as storage is
riskless and relative prices are constant, the value of inventory will move one-for-one with













We show in appendix A that if we assume (a) households have constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) preferences, (b) households choose portfolios on the mean-variance frontier, (c)
seasonally adjusted consumption growth has a log-normal distribution, and (d) the variance
of seasonally adjusted consumption growth is \small," then equations (12) and (13) imply






















adjusted consumption, and all variances and expectations are household-specic.
We cannot directly use (14) to estimate i because consumption may be measured
with error and because we observe total consumption, not seasonally adjusted consumption.
To estimate Var[lnx
it], notice that if (x
i;t+1=x
it) has a log-normal distribution, then
lnx

it =  + eit; (15)
where eit has a normal distribution, and Var[lnx
it] = Var[eit]. Since lnx














lni;m(t) +  + eit + i;t+1   it:
(16)
Let ^ Ve;i be the variance of residuals from a household-specic regression of lncit on month
dummy variables. According to (16), if we had an innitely long time series for the house-
hold, these residuals would equal eit + i;t+1   it and their variance would be Var[eitji] +
2Var[itji] 2Cov[i;t+1;i;tji]. Therefore, ^ Ve;i converges in probability to Var[eitji]+2Var[itji] 
2Cov[i;t+1;i;tji] as T ! 1. If we had estimates of the household-specic variance and serial
correlation of measurement error, we could use them to adjust ^ Ve;i and obtain an estimate of
13Var[lnx
it](= Var[eit]). Since we do not have a good way to estimate the variance and serial
correlation of measurement error, however, we make no adjustment and use ^ Ve;i as our esti-
mate of the variance of seasonally adjusted consumption. Likewise, we make no adjustment
for measurement error in calculating the variance of returns.
Because we are not accounting for measurement error, our estimates of both of the
variances in the denominator of (14) will be biased upward. (The estimated variances include
both the true variances and the variance of measurement error, so the estimates are higher
than the true variances.) Thus our estimates of households' risk aversion coecients i will
be biased downward. In examining variation in the estimated i across households, we are
implicitly assuming that the bias due to measurement error is the same for all households.
A further problem in using (14) to estimate i is that although the time-series average
of a household's actual investment returns RP
i;t+1 will converge in a suciently long sample
to the household's expected return E[Ri;t+1], the time-series average may dier substantially
from the expected return in our nite sample. Thus, for some households, we may estimate
a negative return on assets even though no household would rationally choose assets with
a negative expected return. If the estimated return on assets is negative, we will estimate
i < 0, which does not make sense. Therefore, we calculate our estimate of i only for those
households that have positive estimated return on assets.
We test for heterogeneity in preferences under the portfolio-choice approach as follows.
Let ^ PC
i be the estimate of household i's risk aversion obtained by using nite-sample means
and variances in (14). Let c s.e.(^ PC
i ) be the associated standard error of this estimate. Let  j
be the mean risk aversion of the observed households in village j, and let ^  j be the estimate of
this mean obtained by averaging the estimates ^ PC
i in village j. (Because we have dened  j
14as the mean for the observed households, it diers from ^  j only because of estimation error in
^ PC
i ; there is no discrepancy arising from using data on a nite number of households in the
village. It follows that ^  j converges in probability to  j as the number of time periods goes
to innity, which will be important in the analysis that follows.) Under the null hypothesis
that all households in village j have the same risk preferences, i =  j, we have that
^ PC
i    j
c s.e.(^ PC
i )
d ! N(0;1); (17)
where the convergence in distribution is as the number of time periods goes to innity. Assume
for now that the estimation errors ^ PC











We cannot calculate the 2 statistic in (18) because we do not observe  j but only the estimate































i    j)( j   ^  j)
[c s.e.(^ PC
i )]2 : (19)
Since ^  j
p
!  j, the second and third terms on the right-hand side of (19) converge in proba-











We use (20) to test the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity in preferences within each vil-
lage. We obtain c s.e.(^ PC
i ) by bootstrapping. To account for possible serial correlation in
15consumption growth and return on assets, we use a block bootstrap and draw blocks of 12
months of data with replacement from the original sample, then recalculate c s.e.(^ PC
i ) in each
bootstrap sample; c s.e.(^ PC
i ) is the standard deviation of the bootstrap estimates obtained for
household i. The test can also be implemented using risk tolerance instead of risk aversion
by substituting 1=^ PC
i for ^ PC
i , d 1=j for ^  j, and c s.e.(1=^ PC
i ) for c s.e.(^ PC
i ) in (20). There is no
particular reason to prefer one of these tests over the other, so we perform both tests.
If the estimation errors ^ PC
i   i are correlated across households | for example,
because of common shocks to consumption or returns | the above analysis is not precisely
correct. We think it would be dicult to account for possible correlation in the estimation
errors without a detailed statistical model of asset returns, and even then, inference would be
conditional on assuming the model was correct. However, we note that correlated estimation
errors would make the estimated preferences ^ PC
i similar across households in nite sample
even if there is heterogeneity. Therefore, correlated estimation errors would reduce the power
of our test. If we reject common preferences while assuming uncorrelated estimation errors,
then we can be condent the rejection would be even stronger if we accounted for correlation
in the estimation errors.
C. Relationship between Risk-Sharing and Portfolio-Choice Approaches
The risk-sharing and portfolio-choice methods dier in two important respects. First,
the risk-sharing approach identies risk preferences only up to scale, and the scale is village-
specic. Thus, we cannot use the risk-sharing method to determine whether average risk
aversion diers across villages. The portfolio-choice method identies risk preferences exactly,
not just up to scale, so we can use it to determine whether the average household is more
16risk averse in some villages than others.
Second, the portfolio-choice method diers from the risk-sharing approach both in the
form of the equation estimated and in the data used. The portfolio-choice method uses the
relationship between an individual household's consumption risk and the household's asset
risk and returns to nd the household's risk preferences, on the assumption that the household
has chosen its portfolio optimally. The risk-sharing method ignores asset returns and uses
the correlation between each household's consumption and aggregate consumption to nd
the risk preferences of all households at once. Because the two methods dier, each serves as
a check on the other; if the two methods give similar results, we can have more condence
that our estimates accurately reect households' actual preferences.
We note that there is no contradiction in assuming full insurance for the risk-sharing
estimation method but using each household's idiosyncratic asset returns to estimate pref-
erences in the portfolio-choice method. Even if households are fully insured against idiosyn-
cratic shocks to asset returns, the Euler equation (11) must hold | Samphantharak and
Townsend (2010b) show that it is the rst-order condition in a social planner's problem |
and, therefore, the portfolio-choice method remains valid.
D. The Welfare Cost of Aggregate Risk
We follow the method of Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) to estimate the welfare cost of aggre-
gate risk. The basic idea, following Lucas (1987), is to calculate a household's expected utility
from a risky consumption stream and compare it to the amount of certain consumption that
would yield the same utility.
In essence, we will compare three economies. Economy 1 is the real economy; the
17aggregate endowment in it is risky. Economy 2 is a hypothetical economy in which the aggre-
gate endowment is constant and equal to the expected aggregate endowment from economy
1. Some households would be better o in economy 2 than economy 1, while others are worse
o, depending on their risk aversion: In economy 1, a nearly risk-neutral household can sell
insurance against aggregate risk to more risk-averse households, and this nearly risk-neutral
household would be worse o if it lived in economy 2 and had no opportunity to sell insurance.
We would like to estimate how much better o or worse o households would be in economy
2. To do so, we introduce economy 3, which has a constant aggregate endowment equal to
(1 k) times the aggregate endowment in economy 2. For each household, we nd the value
of k such that the household would be indierent between living in economy 1 and living in
economy 3. If k > 0, then the household is indierent between the real economy 1 and a
hypothetical economy where consumption is certain but smaller by the fraction k; thus, the
household is willing to give up a fraction k of its consumption to eliminate aggregate risk. If
k < 0, aggregate risk gives the household a welfare gain equal to a fraction k of consumption.
We briey outline the method here and refer interested readers to Schulhofer-Wohl
(2008) for details.
We assume the world consists of a sequence of one-period economies indexed by date
t. (By considering one-period economies, we avoid the problem that households with dier-
ent risk preferences also have dierent preferences for intertemporal substitution and thus
will make intertemporal trades even in the absence of aggregate risk. The assumption of a
one-period economy means we are treating shocks as serially uncorrelated. We think this
assumption is reasonable in the context of rural villages where many shocks are related to
weather.) Each economy can be in one of several states s, each with probability s. The states
18and their probabilities are the same for all dates t, and households know the probabilities.
Before the state is known, the households trade a complete set of contingent claims.
We assume aggregate income in economy t in state s is gtms, where gt is a non-
random sequence and ms represents the shock in state s. We normalize the shocks such that
P
s sms = 1, i.e., the expected value of aggregate income in economy t is gt. There is no
storage (or, if there is storage, \aggregate income" refers to aggregate income net of aggregate
storage).
Each household is described by a coecient of relative risk aversion i and an en-
dowment share wi: Household i's endowment in economy t in state s is wigtms, so there is
only aggregate risk and no idiosyncratic risk. We assume the joint distribution of endowment
shares and risk preferences is the same at each date.5
Because markets are complete, the welfare theorems apply, and the consumption allo-
cation will be the same as we derived for the risk-sharing method. One can use the allocation
to derive household i's expected utility in economy t before the state is realized. Let U
it
denote this expected utility. (This is expected utility in economy 1.) Now suppose the
household gave up a fraction k of its endowment but eliminated all aggregate risk, receiving
consumption equal to wi(1   k)gt in every state in economy t. Let ^ Uit(k) be the utility of a
household that gave up a fraction k of its endowment but eliminated all aggregate risk. (This
is expected utility in economy 3.) The welfare cost of aggregate risk, expressed as a fraction
5Since the economy lasts only one period, we do not need to consider heterogeneity in households' discount
factors or in their seasonal preferences as in (1).
19of consumption, is the value of k that solves
^ Uit(k) = U

it: (21)
Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) shows that the welfare cost depends only on the household's risk
aversion i, not on its endowment share or the size of the economy gt, and can be written as











s is the equilibrium price of a claim to one unit of consumption in state s and where
the prices are normalized such that
P
s sp
sms = 1. It is worth noting that for i suciently
close to zero, k(i) is negative, which means the household has a welfare gain from aggregate
risk. The gain arises because the household is selling so much insurance to more risk-averse
households that the resulting risk premiums more than oset the risk the household faces.
We estimate the welfare cost of aggregate risk separately for each village j in the data,
but to simplify the notation, we suppress the dependence on j in what follows. Our objective
is to estimate the function k(i) giving welfare costs of aggregate risk as a function of a
household's risk aversion. To do so, we must estimate village j's prices p
s, which appear in
the welfare cost formula (22), and village j's aggregate shocks ms, which do not appear in the
formula but are required to normalize the prices correctly. Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) proposes
the following procedure, which we follow here.
We have data on a random sample of households in village j for a sequence of dates
 = 1;:::;T. Since the model is stationary, we can use the data at dierent dates to recover
20information about the states realized at those dates; averages over many dates will be the
same as averages over the possible states.
The following notation is useful: For any variable , let ^ E[] be the sample mean of 
across the households in village j at date . Also, let i = 1=i be household i's risk tolerance,
and let   be the mean of i for all households in village j, including households that are not
in our sample.
First, we estimate the mean risk tolerance   as follows. We use the portfolio-choice
method to obtain an estimate ^ i of the risk aversion of each household i. We then estimate  
by ^  , the sample mean of 1=^ i among the households in village j. The law of large numbers
implies that ^   is a consistent estimator of  .
Second, we estimate the aggregate shocks ms as follows. Let d lnm be the residual from
a time-series regression of the log of the sample average of observed consumption [ln( ^ E[ci])]
on an intercept, a time trend, and month dummies. Let ^ m = exp( d lnm) be the estimated
aggregate shock at date ; Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) shows that, in the limit as the numbers
of households and time periods go to innity, ^ m is a consistent estimator of the aggregate
shock ms for the state s that was realized at date .
Third, we estimate the prices p
s as follows. Given  , let d lnp
( ) be ( 1= ) times
the residual from a time-series regression of the sample average of observed log consumption
[( ^ E[lnci])] on an intercept, time trend, and month dummies. (The regression here is the
same as that used to estimate aggregate shocks, except that for aggregate shocks, the depen-
dent variable was the log of mean consumption, while for prices, the dependent variable is the
mean of log consumption.) If we knew  , we could estimate the price by ~ p
( ) = exp[ d lnp
( )],
which Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) shows is a consistent estimator of the price p
s for the state
21s that was realized at date . However, we do not know the exact value of the mean risk
tolerance but instead must use our estimate ^  . Our estimated prices are thus ^ p
 = ~ p(^  ).
We impose the normalization that
P
s sp
sms = 1 by scaling the estimated prices such that
T  1 PT
=1 ^ p
 ^ m = 1. The arguments in Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) imply that ^ p
 is a consistent
estimator of p
s in the limit as the numbers of households and time periods go to innity.
Finally, given the estimated prices, we estimate the welfare cost of aggregate risk, as
a function of the household's risk aversion i, by replacing averages over states with averages
over dates and replacing actual with estimated prices in (22):












The results in Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) and the consistency of ^   imply that ^ k(i) is a consistent
estimator of the welfare cost k(i) in the limit as the numbers of households and time periods
go to innity.
Although ^ k is a consistent estimator of the true welfare cost, ^ k is biased away from zero.
The reason is that the estimated aggregate shocks and prices vary over time both because
actual shocks hit the economy and because, in a nite sample, measurement error causes the
average of households' observed consumption to uctuate more than the average of their true
consumption. In consequence, the data make the economy appear riskier than it really is.
Following Schulhofer-Wohl (2008), we solve this problem with a bootstrap bias correction. Let
^ k be the estimated willingness to pay in the original sample, and let k1;:::;kQ be estimates
calculated using Q dierent samples of the same size as the original sample, drawn from the
original data with replacement. A bias-corrected estimate of k is 2^ k  
PQ
q=1 kq=Q.
22Our bootstrap procedure must deal with two sources of sampling variation: We have
data on only some households in the village and on only some time periods from the entire
history of the world. To address these two sources of variation, we resample both households
and time periods in our bootstrap procedure. Specically, we rst draw households from the
original data with replacement, generating a list of households to include in the bootstrap
sample. Next, we resample with replacement 12-month blocks of time (to account for serial
correlation in shocks) and generate a list of months to include in the bootstrap sample.
The bootstrap sample then consists of data points corresponding to each household on the
list of households, for each month on the list of months. However, we do not bootstrap
our estimate of the mean risk tolerance  ; rather, we estimate this parameter using the
original sample and then employ the same estimate when we calculate the welfare cost in
each bootstrap sample. We experimented with bootstrapping our estimate of   but found
that this resulted in extremely large standard errors. In consequence, the bootstrapping
accounts for our uncertainty about the welfare cost conditional on the mean risk tolerance,
but not for our uncertainty about the mean risk tolerance.
3. Data
We apply the estimation methods described in the previous section to the households
in the Townsend Thai Monthly Survey. Several features of this survey make it useful for our
study. First, the survey provides us with consumption and asset return data at the household
level, allowing us to apply the portfolio-choice method to each household, rather than relying
on the aggregate consumption data commonly used in the asset-pricing literature. Also,
having household-level data allows us to compare the results from the risk-sharing method,
23household by household, to those from the portfolio-choice method. Second, the survey has
relatively high frequency over many years, providing us with a relatively long time series
on consumption and asset return uctuations. Finally, the survey also has information on
household demography that we can use to dene kinship networks, which are one potential
mechanism resulting in the full insurance assumed by the risk-sharing method.
This section presents a brief background on the survey and descriptive statistics of the
variables we analyze. Detailed description of the survey, construction of nancial variables,
and additional descriptive statistics can be found in Samphantharak and Townsend (2010a,b).
A. The Townsend Thai Monthly Survey and Sample Selection
The Townsend Thai Monthly Survey is an ongoing intensive monthly survey initiated
in 1998 in four provinces of Thailand. Chachoengsao and Lopburi are semi-urban provinces
in a more developed central region near the capital city, Bangkok. Buriram and Sisaket
provinces, on the other hand, are rural and located in a less developed northeastern region
by the border of Cambodia. In each of the four provinces, the survey is conducted in four
villages. This monthly survey began with an initial village-wide census. Every structure and
every household was enumerated, and the dened \household" units were created based on
sleeping and eating patterns. Further, all individuals, households, and residential structures
in each of the 16 villages can be identied in subsequent, monthly responses. From the
village-wide census, approximately 45 households in each village were randomly sampled to
become survey respondents. The survey itself began in August 1998 with a baseline interview
on initial conditions of sampled households. The monthly updates started in September 1998
and track inputs, outputs, and changing conditions of the same households over time.
24Sample selection for households included in this paper deserves special attention. First,
the data used in this paper are based on the 84 months starting from month 5, from January
1999 through December 2005. These months are the entire sample available at the time of
the initial writing of this draft and reect the fact that data for analysis are received from the
eld survey unit with a considerable lag. Second, we include only the households that were
present in the survey throughout the 84 months, dropping households that moved out of the
village before month 88 as well as households that were later added to the survey to replace
the drop-out households. This criterion also ensures that consumption for each household is
strictly positive in every month, allowing us to have a balanced panel of the monthly change
in consumption. Third, we drop households whose income is zero in any month. Fourth, since
we compute our returns on assets from net income generated from cultivation, livestock, sh
and shrimp farming, and retail business, we exclude from this study the households whose
entire income in every period during the 84 months was from wage earnings and not directly
from asset-utilizing production activities. Finally, we include in our sample only households
that belong to kinship networks, because full insurance is rejected when we include those
households not in the network. Kinship networks are important economic features of the
villages we study. Relatives usually live in the same village and engage in both nancial
and non-nancial transactions among themselves, potentially leading to full insurance. We
construct kinship networks from the information on close familial relatives that are not a part
of the household. A household is dened as in a network if it has at least one familial relative
living in the same village. There are 369 households in the sample: 72 from Chachoengsao,
82 from Buriram, 93 from Lopburi, and 122 from Sisaket.
25B. Construction of Variables
Consumption
Our consumption variable includes both monthly consumption of food and monthly
expenditure on nonfood items and utilities. Food consumption includes the consumption of
outputs such as crops produced by the household, the consumption of food from invento-
ries, and expenditures on food provided by nonhousehold members. Unlike other modules of
the Townsend Thai Monthly Survey, several consumption items are collected weekly during
months 1{25 and biweekly afterward, in order to minimize recall errors. We convert consump-
tion to per capita units by dividing by the number of household members present during the
month to which the consumption refers.
We put consumption in real terms by deating the data with the monthly Consumer
Price Index (CPI) at the national level from the Bank of Thailand. Although we realize that
ination in each village could dier from national ination, we must rely on the national
statistics because we do not have a reliable village-level price index at the time of writing
this paper.
Return on Assets
Consistent with the consumption data, we use a household as our unit of analysis and
consider the return on the household's total xed assets rather than returns on individual
assets. Specically, we dene the rate of return on assets (ROA) as the household's accrued
net income divided by the household's average total xed assets over the month in which
the income was generated. Since we want to measure the real rate of return rather than the
nominal rate of return, we use real accrued net income and the real value of the household's
26xed assets in our calculation, again deating the data using the monthly national-level CPI
from the Bank of Thailand.
Our simple calculation of ROA raises one obvious problem. In our data, households'
net incomes embed contributions from both physical capital and human capital, but we
are interested in the risks and returns to physical assets. ROA is therefore overestimated.
As a remedy, we calculate the compensation to household labor and subtract this labor
compensation from total household income. Compensation to household labor includes both
the explicit wage earnings from external labor markets and the implicit shadow wage from
labor spent on the household's own production activities. The calculation also takes into
account the fact that households select into dierent occupations, as described in detail in
Samphantharak and Townsend (2010a, chapter 5) and Townsend and Yamada (2008).
Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for household consumption and ROA. Mean per
capita real consumption is 1294.6 Thai baht per month (in April 2001 baht). According to
the Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2009), purchasing power parity in 2001 was 12.35 baht
per U.S. dollar, so on average, households in the sample live on the equivalent of about U.S.
$3.50 per person, per day. The table shows that consumption grows slowly, on average, but
that consumption growth is quite variable. Asset returns are high on average but also quite
variable.
274. Results
Table 2 presents the tests of ecient risk sharing based on (6).6 The coecient on
income is statistically signicant at the 5 percent level in only two of the 16 villages. In the
other 14 villages, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of full insurance. Further, the eect of
idiosyncratic income shocks on consumption is small in practical terms: Even in the villages
where we reject full insurance, a 1 percent increase in income is associated with only a 0.013
percent increase in consumption after controlling for aggregate shocks. When we estimate
a common coecient on income across all villages, we gain statistical power and come close
to rejecting the null of full insurance at the 5 percent level, but the coecient is small; a
1 percent increase in income is associated with a 0.003 percent increase in consumption.
We note that the evidence against full insurance is weak even though we have not allowed
for nonseparability between consumption and leisure or for heterogeneity in risk preferences,
both of which would lead our test to over-reject full insurance.7 We think, therefore, that
there is little evidence against full insurance in the villages we study, and that it is reasonable
to proceed to estimate risk preferences under the maintained hypothesis of full insurance.
We would consider the assumption of full insurance less reasonable if we included
households not in kinship networks in our sample. Table 3 tests for full insurance using data
on the 136 households that have measured consumption and income in every month but are
not in kinship networks. In most villages, this sample is much smaller than the sample of
6For these tests only, but not for the rest of the paper, we use total consumption and income rather than
per capita variables because converting to per capita units would produce a mechanical correlation between
measured per capita income and measured per capita consumption if there is any measurement error in
household size.
7Classical measurement error in income would lead our test to under-reject full insurance. However, unless
the signal-to-noise ratio is very small | which we think is unlikely given the detailed nature of the survey
questionnaire | the true elasticity of consumption with respect to idiosyncratic income must still be close to
zero in practical terms.
28households in networks, so the test is less powerful. Nonetheless, we reject full insurance at
the 5 percent level in three of the 14 villages where we have enough data to perform the test
(albeit with the wrong sign | a negative eect of income on consumption | in one of these
three villages). The coecient on income is the same in the pooled regression for non-network
and network households, but is estimated quite imprecisely for the non-network households.
In results not reported here, we converted the income and consumption data to annual terms,
which removes monthly uctuations due to measurement error and seasonality, and re-ran
the regressions. In the annual data, the pooled regression shows a slightly negative and
statistically insignicant eect of income on consumption for households in kinship networks,
but a positive and highly signicant coecient | a strong rejection of full insurance | for
households not in networks.
Table 4 presents the tests of the null hypothesis of identical risk preferences, based
on the risk-sharing method and the GMM overidentication statistic for moment conditions
(10). We reject the null of identical preferences at the 5 percent level in eight of the 16 villages
and at the 10 percent level in nine of the 16. When we pool the data from all villages, we
gain statistical power and strongly reject the null that preferences are identical within each
village. (Our pooled test makes no assumptions about whether there is heterogeneity across
villages.)
Table 5 presents the estimates of risk preferences in each village from the portfolio-
choice method. The table shows the mean risk aversion and mean risk tolerance in each village
and the tests for heterogeneity based on the test statistic in (20). The average estimated
risk aversion across the entire sample is about 1, though average risk aversion is about half
that in some villages and twice as high in others. When we construct the test statistic
29for heterogeneity using estimates of households' risk tolerance, we strongly reject the null
hypothesis of identical preferences. The rejection is less strong when we construct the test
statistic using estimates of households' risk aversion (the inverse of risk tolerance); in that
case, we reject identical preferences in 10 of the 16 villages.
Table 6 investigates the relationship between the two methods for measuring risk
aversion. For each household i that has positive estimated return on assets,8 we have two
estimates of risk tolerance: 1=^ RS
i , the estimate from the risk-sharing method, and 1=^ PC
i ,
the estimate from the portfolio-choice method. (We examine 1=^ i rather than ^ i because our
moment conditions for the risk-sharing method in equation (10) are linear in 1=i but not
in i.) We calculate the correlation of 1=^ RS
i and 1=^ PC
i within each village.9 We then use
a Monte Carlo permutation test to see whether the correlation is statistically signicantly
dierent from zero.10 The table shows that our two estimates of preferences are positively
8Recall that we cannot use the portfolio-choice method when the household's estimated return on assets
is negative.
9Recall that the risk-sharing method identies preferences only up to a village-specic scale factor. That
is, 1=^ RS
i  mj=i, where mj is an unknown number. Therefore, while our two estimates should be positively
correlated within each village if they are both accurate estimates of the true risk tolerance 1=i, it is not
worthwhile to compare the levels of 1=^ RS
i and 1=^ PC
i because the levels can dier even if our methods are
correct. We cannot pool the data from all villages and then use village xed eects to account for mj (for
example, by regressing 1=^ RS
i on 1=^ PC
i and a set of village dummy variables) because mj multiplies i but
the village xed eects would be additive. Further, we cannot take logs of the risk preference estimates |
so that the scale factor mj would enter additively | because for some households, our estimated 1=^ RS
i is
negative.
10The permutation test randomly reorders the list of 1=^ PC
i across households in 100,000 ways and computes
the correlation of each reordered list with the original list of 1=^ RS
i . (We use a Monte Carlo test with 100,000
draws rather than an exact test with all possible permutations because some villages in our sample have too
many possible permutations | in a village of 34 households, there are 34!  3  1038 possible reorderings
| to compute all of the possible correlations in a reasonable amount of time.) This procedure gives us
the sampling distribution of the correlation coecient when there is no actual correlation between the two
measures of risk tolerance, since by reordering the list of 1=^ PC
i we are re-assigning risk tolerance estimates to
dierent households at random. The two-sided p-value for the null hypothesis of no correlation is the fraction
of reordered correlations that are larger in absolute value than the actual value of corr(1=^ RS
i ;1=^ PC
i ) in
the original data. If corr(1=^ RS
i ;1=^ PC
i ) > 0, the one-sided p-value is the fraction of reordered correlations
that are greater than corr(1=^ RS
i ;1=^ PC
i ); if corr(1=^ RS
i ;1=^ PC
i ) < 0, the one-sided p-value is the fraction of
reordered correlations that are less than corr(1=^ RS
i ;1=^ PC
i ).
30correlated in 11 of the villages and negatively correlated in the other ve. In four of the six
villages in which the correlation is statistically signicantly dierent from zero at least at the
10 percent level, the correlation is positive. We conclude that there is some weak evidence of
a positive relationship between our two estimates of each household's preferences.
Tables 7 and 8 examine the relationship of risk tolerance to observed demographic
characteristics of the household. Table 7 uses preferences estimated from the risk-sharing
method, while table 8 uses preferences estimated from the portfolio-choice method. For com-
parability, in each table we restrict the sample to households for which both methods could
be used to estimate preferences. (This requires the household to have positive estimated asset
returns so that the portfolio-choice method is feasible.) Demographics are measured in the
initial round of the survey. We nd little evidence that estimated risk preferences are related
to demographics. There is a positive, marginally statistically signicant relationship between
risk tolerance and the head's age using either method to measure preferences. Education, net
wealth, and the numbers of men, women, and children in the household are not associated
with either measure of risk tolerance. These patterns persist whether or not we include village
xed eects in the regressions. In addition, observed demographics explain only a few percent
of the variation in estimated risk tolerance. Theory provides little guidance as to whether
we should expect observable variables to be related to preferences. For example, net wealth
may depend in large part on a household's initial endowment when the economy began, and
| since initial endowments | theory has little to say about whether the initial endowment,
and thus wealth, will be related to preferences. Recall also that, under complete markets,
wealth per se has nothing to do with risk aversion: Complete markets lead to a complete
separation between consumption and production, so there is no reason why risk preferences
31in themselves should aect how much wealth a household accumulates.11
In table 9 and gure 2, we turn to estimating the welfare costs of aggregate risk. Table 9
shows the estimated mean risk tolerance in each village and the willingness to pay to eliminate
aggregate risk for a household with that risk tolerance. In every village, the estimated mean
risk tolerance is above 1. The estimates do not necessarily imply, though, that the mean risk
aversion is below 1: Risk aversion is the inverse of risk tolerance, so by Jensen's inequality,
mean risk aversion is greater than the inverse of mean risk tolerance. In each village, a
household whose risk tolerance matches the mean risk tolerance of that village is estimated
to face welfare losses from aggregate risk. The welfare losses for households with the mean
risk tolerance are on the order of one-half to 1 percent of mean consumption, or about 10
times what has been estimated for the United States (Lucas, 1987; Schulhofer-Wohl, 2008).
However, owing to the small sample size for each village, our estimates are imprecise and the
95 percent condence intervals for the mean household's welfare loss include zero. Figure
2 shows the importance of heterogeneity for understanding the welfare cost of risk. In each
village, the less risk averse a household is, the smaller its welfare cost, and households that are
suciently close to risk neutral have welfare gains from aggregate risk. For example, in village
7 in Chachoengsao, some very risk-averse households have welfare losses from aggregate risk
equivalent to about 4 percent of consumption, but suciently risk-tolerant households could
have welfare gains in excess of 6 percent of consumption.
11Note, however, that households with a higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution will accumulate
more wealth if the economy is growing over time (Dumas, 1989; Wang, 1996). With time-separable expected
utility, the coecient of relative risk aversion is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Thus there is some reason, in a time-separable expected utility model, to expect a relationship between wealth
and risk aversion. A model with, e.g., recursive utility could break this link.
325. Conclusion
This paper uses two methods, one based on a complete-markets model and the other
based on a model of household-level portfolio choice, to measure the risk preferences of
Thai households. The results are encouraging: Although preferences are measured with a
substantial amount of noise, the two measures are correlated with each other in most villages.
Thus, methods heretofore applied to data from industrialized countries with deep nancial
markets are also useful for understanding the behavior of households in a quite dierent
economic environment.
33Appendix
A1. Derivation of Portfolio-Choice Method
We show here how to obtain (14) from (12) and (13) under the assumptions that
(a) households choose portfolios on the mean-variance frontier, (b) households have CRRA
preferences, (c) seasonally adjusted consumption growth has a log-normal distribution, and
(d) the variance of seasonally adjusted consumption growth is \small." Much of our exposition
parallels Cochrane (2001) and Samphantharak and Townsend (2010b).





































































































































 1, (A4) implies
 






















which is the Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) bound on the risk premium.
Inequality (A5) applies not just to any single asset k but to any combination of assets
| in particular, to the household's actual portfolio. Thus, if RP
i;t+1 is the gross return on the
household's portfolio, then























Portfolios on the mean-variance frontier maximize the expected return for any given variance.
Therefore, if we apply assumption (a) | that the household chooses a portfolio on the mean-
variance frontier | (A6) must hold with equality. (Otherwise, there would be a portfolio
with the same variance as the household's portfolio but higher expected return, contradicting
the assumption that the household's portfolio is on the mean-variance frontier.) Applying
assumption (b) | CRRA preferences | (A6) at equality becomes
























35Using (13), it is convenient to rewrite (A7) as






































































We now use assumption (c), that seasonally adjusted consumption growth (x
i;t+1=x
it)

























Further, for any random variable A, if lnA  N(A;2
A), then E(A) = exp(A + 2
A=2) and
Var(A) = [exp(2
A)   1]exp(2A + 2


























































































dx)   1: (A14)
Finally, using assumption (d), if 2
dx is close to zero, then exp(2
i 2
dx)   1  2
i 2
dx. Thus,
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40Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Variable mean std. dev. observations
real total consumption per capita 1298.5 2367.8 30,576
ln(real total consumption per capita) 6.85 0.69 30,576
one-month consumption growth 0.0027 0.5048 30,212
return on assets 7.32 121.78 30,576
The table reports descriptive statistics for key variables. The unit of analy-
sis is the household-month. Consumption (in Thai baht) is monthly house-
hold food consumption and monthly household expenditure on nonfood
consumption items. Consumption is adjusted to real per capita units using
monthly household size data and nationwide Consumer Price Index (base
month April 2001). One-month consumption growth is the log change in
real total consumption per capita from month t   1 to month t, and is
calculated for all months except the rst month in the sample. Return on
assets is in percentages.
41Table 2: Tests of ecient risk sharing.
village coe. std. err. p-value obs. HH R2
Chachoengsao
2 0.0090 0.0054 0.112 1764 21 0.103
4 -0.0028 0.0070 0.692 2016 24 0.176
7 0.0032 0.0085 0.718 924 11 0.211
8 -0.0011 0.0048 0.827 1260 15 0.239
Buriram
2 -0.0081 0.0113 0.479 2352 27 0.130
10 0.0051 0.0047 0.304 1008 11 0.199
13 0.0098 0.0057 0.105 1596 18 0.250
14 0.0073 0.0060 0.237 1932 22 0.246
Lopburi
1 0.0099 0.0068 0.160 1932 23 0.074
3 -0.0102 0.0132 0.452 1260 15 0.137
4 -0.0008 0.0062 0.898 2520 30 0.080
6 0.0004 0.0057 0.945 2100 25 0.146
Sisaket
1 0.0057 0.0041 0.177 2352 28 0.180
6 0.0004 0.0034 0.899 3276 39 0.185
9 0.0132 0.0033 0.000 3024 36 0.217
10 0.0128 0.0058 0.041 1596 19 0.157
pooled
- 0.0034 0.0017 0.052 30576 364 0.167
The table reports the eect of idiosyncratic income shocks
on consumption. Unit of observation is household-month.
Consumption is monthly household food consumption and
monthly household expenditure on nonfood consumption
items. Income is monthly accrued income. Consumption
and income are adjusted for ination using national Con-
sumer Price Index. Each row reports a separate regression
using data from one village. Column labeled \coe." reports
the coecient on log income in an OLS regression of log con-
sumption on household xed eects, time xed eects, and
log income (6); \std. err." is the standard error, clustered by
household; p-value is for a test of the null hypothesis that
the coecient on log income is zero; \obs." is the number of
household-month observations; and \HH" is the number of
households. Pooled regression uses data from all villages and
interacts time eects with village eects to allow dierent
aggregate shocks by village.  indicates coecient is statisti-
cally signicantly dierent from zero at 5 percent level.
42Table 3: Tests of ecient risk sharing, for households not in
kinship networks.
village coe. std. err. p-value obs. HH R2
Chachoengsao
2 -0.0031 0.0071 0.669 1680 20 0.104
4 0.0195 0.0167 0.264 1176 14 0.194
7 -0.0019 0.0067 0.780 1596 19 0.150
8 -0.0059 0.0081 0.480 1344 16 0.206
Buriram
2 0.0143 0.0133 0.317 672 8 0.183
10 - - - 84 1 -
13 0.0101 0.0049 0.108 420 5 0.504
14 0.0079 0.0022 0.036 336 4 0.465
Lopburi
1 -0.0045 0.0106 0.681 756 9 0.164
3 0.0216 0.0278 0.474 504 6 0.220
4 0.0001 0.0071 0.991 588 7 0.180
6 -0.0125 0.0062 0.101 504 6 0.228
Sisaket
1 0.0278 0.0065 0.002 840 10 0.213
6 0.0129 0.0126 0.383 336 4 0.413
9 - - - 84 1 -
10 -0.0004 0.0000 0.000 168 2 0.615
pooled
- 0.0032 0.0032 0.315 11088 132 0.210
The table reports the eect of idiosyncratic income shocks on consumption among households
not in kinship networks. Unit of observation is household-month. Consumption is monthly
household food consumption and monthly household expenditure on nonfood consumption
items. Income is monthly accrued income. Consumption and income are adjusted for
ination using national Consumer Price Index. Each row reports a separate regression
using data from one village; test is not performed if village has only one household not
in a network. Column labeled \coe." reports the coecient on log income in an OLS
regression of log consumption on household xed eects, time xed eects, and log income
(6); \std. err." is the standard error, clustered by household; p-value is for a test of the null
hypothesis that the coecient on log income is zero; \obs." is the number of household-
month observations; and \HH" is the number of households. Pooled regression uses data
from all villages and interacts time eects with village eects to allow dierent aggregate
shocks by village.  indicates coecient is statistically signicantly dierent from zero at 5
percent level.
43Table 4: Tests for heterogeneity in risk
preferences (risk-sharing method).
village 2 d.f. p-value
Chachoengsao
2 38.70 20 0.007
4 35.46 23 0.047
7 21.20 10 0.020
8 33.55 14 0.002
Buriram
2 34.32 26 0.127
10 9.93 10 0.446
13 28.41 17 0.040
14 37.17 21 0.016
Lopburi
1 25.64 22 0.267
3 29.80 14 0.008
4 37.89 29 0.125
6 44.79 24 0.006
Sisaket
1 40.05 27 0.051
6 44.33 38 0.222
9 37.45 35 0.357
10 22.33 18 0.218
pooled
- 521.03 348 5:0  10 9
The table reports tests of the null hypothesis that all households in a given village have
the same coecient of relative risk tolerance. 2 is the overidentication test statistic for
the null hypothesis that all households in the village have the same risk tolerance, ob-
tained by estimating moment condition (10) by two-step ecient GMM under the restric-
tion 1 = 2 =  = Nj; \d.f." is the degrees of freedom of the 2 statistic, equal to the
number of households in the village minus one. Pooled test is for the hypothesis that risk
tolerance is constant within each village, without assuming anything about heterogeneity
across villages. Unit of observation is household-month. Consumption is monthly house-
hold food consumption and monthly household expenditure on nonfood consumption items.
Consumption is adjusted to real per capita units using monthly household size data and
nationwide Consumer Price Index.
44Table 5: Tests for heterogeneity in risk preferences (portfolio-choice method).
risk aversion i risk tolerance 1=i
village households mean 2 p-value mean 2 p-value
Chachoengsao
2 13 2.00 277.29 0.0000 1.56 3543.60 0.0000
4 21 0.79 78.44 0.0000 2.47 1646.42 0.0000
7 6 0.98 6.69 0.3509 1.28 32.21 0.0000
8 14 0.61 31.11 0.0053 5.11 7986.64 0.0000
Buriram
2 18 0.62 12.54 0.8184 2.97 368.59 0.0000
10 8 0.34 5.87 0.6618 4.02 147.64 0.0000
13 10 0.41 14.27 0.1610 7.61 2255.00 0.0000
14 15 0.84 73.55 0.0000 3.55 4209.49 0.0000
Lopburi
1 19 1.20 96.08 0.0000 1.36 1011.17 0.0000
3 8 2.12 348.07 0.0000 1.33 3981.73 0.0000
4 27 1.40 173.59 0.0000 1.29 2061.54 0.0000
6 24 1.82 485.27 0.0000 1.29 3074.97 0.0000
Sisaket
1 22 0.43 21.94 0.4633 3.78 457.10 0.0000
6 34 0.78 117.07 0.0000 1.85 2010.67 0.0000
9 22 0.76 33.96 0.0495 3.24 2141.48 0.0000
10 13 0.47 9.68 0.7199 2.90 36.03 0.0006
pooled
- 274 0.98 1358.43 0.0000 2.64 77568.89 0.0000
The table reports tests of the null hypothesis that all households in a given
village have the same coecient of relative risk aversion or coecient of rel-
ative risk aversion. The sample includes only households with positive es-
timated return on assets (so portfolio-choice method is feasible). \house-




i   ^  j)=c s.e.(^ PC
i )]2 is the test statistic for the null that all
households in the village have the same preferences. Standard errors are
obtained by bootstrapping, using 1,000 draws from the original sample with
replacement; bootstrap draws are of 12-month blocks to account for serial cor-
relation. Pooled test is for the hypothesis that risk tolerance is constant within
and across villages. Unit of observation is household-month. Consumption is
monthly household food consumption and monthly household expenditure on
nonfood consumption items. Consumption is adjusted to real per capita units
using monthly household size data and nationwide Consumer Price Index.
45Table 6: Correlation between estimated
risk tolerance from risk-sharing and
portfolio-choice methods.
p-value
village corr. 1-sided 2-sided HH
Chachoengsao
2 0.180 0.278 0.557 13
4 0.254 0.145 0.266 21
7 -0.652 0.083 0.167 6
8 -0.416 0.005 0.120 14
Buriram
2 0.337 0.074 0.159 18
10 0.522 0.073 0.200 8
13 -0.003 0.536 0.994 10
14 0.179 0.291 0.563 15
Lopburi
1 0.118 0.314 0.632 19
3 0.129 0.400 0.745 8
4 0.049 0.390 0.810 27
6 0.790 0.000 0.000 24
Sisaket
1 -0.178 0.225 0.455 22
6 0.279 0.062 0.112 34
9 0.034 0.419 0.853 22
10 -0.014 0.559 0.959 13
The table reports correlations between
estimates of households' preferences ob-
tained by the two dierent methods de-
veloped in the text. The unit of obser-
vation is the household. The sample in-
cludes only households with positive esti-
mated return on assets (so portfolio-choice
method is feasible). p-values are from a
Monte Carlo permutation test in which
we randomly reorder the list of 1=^ PC
i in
100,000 ways and compute the correlation
of each reordered list with the original list
of 1=^ RS
i . The p-value for the null hypoth-
esis of no correlation is the percentile of
corr(1=^ RS
i ;1=^ PC
i ) in the distribution of
reordered correlations.
46Table 7: Association between household demographics and estimated risk tolerance from risk-
sharing method.
estimated risk tolerance
A. Without village xed eects
adult men 0.012 0.011
(0.009) (0.011)




head's age 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
highest education 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
net wealth (millions of baht) -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
joint signif. p-value 0.147
R-squared 0.011 0.004 0.002 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.032
B. With village xed eects
adult men 0.009 0.005
(0.007) (0.009)




head's age 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
highest education 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
net wealth (millions of baht) 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
joint signif. p-value 0.281
R-squared 0.215 0.214 0.215 0.214 0.211 0.213 0.223
Observations 274 274 274 274 274 274 274
The table reports the association between demographic variables and households' estimated pref-
erences obtained by the risk-sharing method. The unit of observation is the household. The
sample includes only households with positive estimated return on assets (so portfolio-choice
method is feasible). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by village in parenthe-
ses. Demographics are measured in the initial survey. Net wealth is in millions of baht. \Joint
signif. p-value" is the p-value for the null hypothesis that the coecients on all of the demo-
graphic variables are zero in a regression including all the variables at once.  indicates coecient
is statistically signicantly dierent from zero at the 5 percent level.
47Table 8: Association between household demographics and estimated risk tolerance from portfolio-
choice method.
estimated risk tolerance
A. Without village xed eects
adult men 0.158 0.102
(0.395) (0.465)




head's age 0.024 0.030
(0.016) (0.015)
highest education 0.031 0.053
(0.061) (0.063)
net wealth (millions of baht) -0.031 -0.055
(0.056) (0.071)
joint signif. p-value 0.285
R-squared 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.012
B. With village xed eects
adult men 0.172 0.070
(0.409) (0.518)




head's age 0.017 0.025
(0.016) (0.015)
highest education 0.068 0.092
(0.055) (0.080)
net wealth (millions of baht) -0.001 -0.022
(0.073) (0.090)
joint signif. p-value 0.095
R-squared 0.125 0.124 0.124 0.126 0.127 0.124 0.133
Observations 274 274 274 274 274 274 274
The table reports the association between demographic variables and households' estimated pref-
erences obtained by the portfolio-choice method. The unit of observation is the household. The
sample includes only households with positive estimated return on assets (so portfolio-choice
method is feasible). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by village in parenthe-
ses. Demographics are measured in the initial survey. Net wealth is in millions of baht. \Joint
signif. p-value" is the p-value for the null hypothesis that the coecients on all of the demographic
variables are zero in a regression including all the variables at once.
48Table 9: Estimated mean risk tolerance and welfare cost of aggregate risk for a
household with the mean risk tolerance, by village.
WTP to eliminate aggregate risk
village mean risk tolerance bias-corrected estimate 95% condence interval
Chachoengsao
2 1.56 0.4% (-0.7%,1.1%)
4 2.47 0.2% (-0.6%,0.6%)
7 1.28 2.9% (-0.5%,5.3%)
8 5.11 0.3% (-0.1%,0.6%)
Buriram
2 2.97 0.6% (-0.4%,1.3%)
10 4.02 0.4% (-1.7%,1.4%)
13 7.61 0.2% (-0.1%,0.4%)
14 3.55 0.7% (-0.3%,1.3%)
Lopburi
1 1.36 0.2% (-1.4%,0.9%)
3 1.33 0.9% (-2.8%,2.2%)
4 1.29 0.4% (-0.7%,1.1%)
6 1.29 0.4% (-0.8%,1.1%)
Sisaket
1 3.78 0.3% (-0.2%,0.6%)
6 1.85 0.9% (-0.4%,1.8%)
9 3.24 0.5% (0.0%,1.0%)
10 2.90 1.0% (-1.2%,2.1%)
The table reports the mean risk tolerance among households in each village, as
estimated with the portfolio-choice method, and the estimated willingness to pay
to eliminate aggregate risk for a household with the mean risk tolerance. The
mean risk tolerance is estimated based only on households with positive estimated
return on assets (so portfolio-choice method is feasible). The willingness to pay
is reported as a percentage of mean consumption; the table shows the bootstrap
bias-corrected point estimate and the 95 percent equal-tailed percentile condence
interval, calculated from 1,000 bootstrap samples drawn from the original sample
with replacement. To construct each bootstrap sample, we rst draw households
from the original data with replacement, generating a list of households to include
in the bootstrap sample; next, we resample with replacement 12-month blocks of
time (to account for serial correlation in shocks) and generate a list of months
to include in the bootstrap sample; nally, the bootstrap sample consists of data
points corresponding to each household on the list of households, for each month
on the list of months.
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